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Kaufman, Anne L., M.A., July 1994 English
"Ever so Many Generations Hence": Rereading People vs. Abbot 
(1837)
Director: Nancy Cook
In this paper I hope to open a discussion of how the 
language the legal system uses to discuss women's sexuality 
began to evolve. How has it happened, for example, that the 
language used in a particular rape case, People v. Abbot, 19 
Wend 192 (1838) can appear in a discussion of the language 
of women's sexuality? While it may seem overly focused to 
consider one such case in depth, as historians have noted, 
legal (and cultural) attitudes toward women in the United 
States evolved at local and state levels as the new country 
began the process of defining itself. One case, then, can 
provide a small but effective picture of developing 
attitudes toward women (as well of the history of rape law).
The opinion written by Judge Esek Cowen for the court in 
Abbot takes pains to set forth the author's concept of 
appropriate female sexuality. The bulk of the opinion 
focuses on this matter, while the case itself turns on a 
point of law that makes 90% of the opinion irrelevant to the 
disposition of the case. It would be a mistake, however, to 
see Judge Cowen's discursiveness as a unique event; the law 
is shaped by dicta as much as by statute, and Cowen was 
neither the first nor the last judge to use a court opinion 
as an op-ed piece. It is Cowen's choice of language, and the 
frequency with which this case is cited in subsequent rape 
cases, that makes Abbot an interesting and useful moment to 
consider in the discourse on female sexuality.
On first reading, Cowen's opinion seemed both 
anachronistic and appalling. Closer inspection and the 
research involved in building a context around this case, 
reveal a longstanding tradition of resistance to the 
attitudes Cowen espouses. Certain nineteenth century women 
writers, such as Elizabeth Stoddard, used their fiction to 
initiate such a pattern of resistance, while others, such as 
Susan Warner, lined up in Esek Cowen's camp. The Abbot case 
thus becomes useful not only as interpretive possibility 
inherent in its text, but as a starting point from which to 
begin a wider-ranging investigation of the development of 
rape law, of the language men and women use to talk about 
women's sexuality, and of the culture we inhabit.
11
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It avails not, time nor place— distance avails 
not,
I am with you, you men and women of a generation, 
or ever so many generations hence.
Just as you feel when you look on the river and
sky, so I felt,
Just as any one of you is one of a living crowd, I
was one of
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INTRODUCTION
Last Spring I read several chapters of my father's 
biography of Justice Benjamin Cardozo^. I came to a section 
that treats Cardozo's participation in the case People v. 
Carey, 223 N.Y. 519. Cardozo's comments on this case, in an 
unpublished memo, lit a bulb over my head, just like in the 
comic strips— his words resonated with some of my own work 
on the representation of desire and sexuality in the works 
of some nineteenth-century American women writers. Although 
it may seem problematic to modern scholars, nineteenth- 
century rape opinions do expound upon women's sexuality at 
great length. Rape was not yet entirely (or at all) 
separable from sexual intercourse in the cultural 
vocabulary, and issues of consent complicated the issue as 
well. I began to search for a rape case more contemporary 
with the works of fiction with which I was already engaged. 
In People v. Abbot (19 Wend. 192), a case dealing with rape 
charges brought by Philena Morehouse against the preacher 
who held her indentures, Orson Abbot, I found everything I 
could have hoped for and more. The case was tried before the 
local Court of General Sessions, and was heard, on appeal, 
by the Supreme Court of Judicature of the state of New York 
in 18382. The opinion issued by Judge Esek Cowen for the 
Supreme Court of Judicature serves as a window into a 
particular nineteenth-century perspective on female 
sexuality. Cowen's language, as I will show, offers a wealth
of interpretive possibility, and can be regarded as the
5
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starting point for a fruitful inquiry into the development 
of the language men and women use to talk about women’s 
sexuality.
It may seem unusual to come at legal research from a 
literature background, but this background gives me a 
different perspective on the issues of language and textual 
analysis, and allows me to bring a different critical 
perspective to bear on the material.
In nineteenth-century women's writing, discussions of 
women's sexuality appear within the context of narrative and 
plot, and are seldom approached directly. The elaborate 
encoding of sexual desire contrasts starkly with the blunt 
dichotomies presented in nineteenth-century rape case 
opinions. In this paper I hope to open a discussion of how 
the language the legal system uses to discuss women's 
sexuality began to evolve, contrasting it with the language 
women writers used to treat the same subject. It seems odd 
and jarring that the language used in a rape case can appear 
in a discussion of the language of women's sexuality. This 
combination is a moral and philosophical conflation with its 
roots in the evolving republican ideology of post­
revolutionary America.
While it may seem overly focused to consider one such 
case in depth, as Joan Hoff Wilson has noted, legal (and 
cultural) attitudes toward women "did not emerge full-blown
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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with only sporadic Supreme Court decisions. They evolved 
structurally substantively at local and state levels after 
1787".3 One case, then, can provide a small but effective 
picture of developing attitudes toward women (as well of the 
history of rape law).
Judge Cowen's opinion takes pains to set forth his 
concept of appropriate female sexuality.^ The bulk of the 
opinion focuses on this matter, while the case itself turns 
on a procedural issue that makes ninety percent of the 
opinion irrelevant to the disposition of the case^. it would 
be a mistake, however, to see Cowen's discursiveness as a 
unique event; the law is shaped by dicta as much as by 
statute, and Cowen was neither the first nor the last judge 
to use a court opinion as an op-ed piece. It is Cowen's 
choice of language, and the frequency with which this case 
is cited in subsequent rape cases^, that makes Abbot an 
interesting and useful moment to consider in the discourse 
on female sexuality.
Given the fact that Lyons and Sodus, the towns in which 
the attacks alleged in People v. Abbot occurred, are only 
15-25 miles from Seneca Falls, New York, I had hoped to be 
able to investigate the influence that the events leading up
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to the Seneca Falls convention in 1848 may have had on Judge 
Cowen and his attitudes toward women, but so far I have been 
unable to find primary sources with which to begin this 
discussion. And contemporary transportation issues may well 
make direct influence a moot point. It seems very neat that 
Lyons and Sodus are so close to Seneca Falls, but by 1830s 
standards 20 miles is not close. Although the Erie Canal, a 
significant advance in transportation, was completed in 
1825, and the federal government actively encouraged the 
growth of the railroads and westward expansion, the state of 
the roads in western New York State at that time meant that 
it was close to a full day's trip from Lyons to Seneca 
Falls^ . In 1816, President James Madison and Congressman 
John C. Calhoun battled over a bill that would have provided 
federal funds for local roads: Madison vetoed Calhoun's 
bill, "adamantly insisting that it was unconstitutional"® . 
And the telegraph did not become a significant factor in 
communication until the middle of the nineteenth century.
This essay is a step in my ongoing effort to build a 
context for understanding the culture we live in today. I 
hope that this brief take on a complex subject will provide 
an interesting opening to a fascinating discourse. And where 
better to find nineteenth-century men writing about women's 
sexuality than in rape case opinions?^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A broad study of rape opinions, placed next to an 
equally comprehensive study of women's writing on sexuality, 
will begin to offer a set of ideas about the way women's and 
men's language about women and their sexuality has evolved 
along such different paths in the past 150 years. It is, 
however, a huge task, and one that I do not propose to 
undertake in this space- The work of this essay, then, will 
be to rebuild the context around a rape case I see as 
particularly problematic:The People v. Orson Abbot . This 
case resulted in a conviction at the local level and was 
reversed on the procedural issue that the Court of General 
Sessions had no jurisdiction to try a rape case.
I also hope to give a brief overview of women writing 
fiction that dealt with issues of on women's sexuality at 
roughly the same time in order to frame the investigation of 
two such different discourses^®.
 ̂ Biography of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, by Andrew L. Kaufman, 
forthcoming from Harvard University Press.
^ Under statehood, until the judicial reorganization of 1847, the 
Supreme Court of Judicature was the State's highest court of law 
possessing original jurisdiction The Constitution of 1822 changed the 
organization of the Supreme Court. The number of justices was reduced 
from five to three. The Governor now appointed the justices, with Senate 
approval. The state was divided into eight judicial circuits, each 
presided over by an appointive circuit judge. These circuit judges 
presided over civil trials in the circuit courts and criminal trials in 
the courts of oyer and terminer from >uely & Constantly Kept, a 
publication of the New York State Archives, p.5.
^ Joan Hoff Wilson, Hidden Riches; Legal Records and Women, 1750-1825 
in Woman's Being, Woman's Place: Female Identity and Vocation in 
American History , Mary Kelley, ed., Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1979, p. 
14. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically in the text.
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^There are opinions in 19th century rape cases which do not exhibit the 
forceful and colorful language of Judge Cowen, in People v. Abbot 
(1837). One in particular is Judge Strong's opinion in People v. Jackson 
(1857), which exhibits a sensibility (perhaps informed by the debate 
leading up to the Seneca Falls convention in 1848) that is both 
openminded and humane.
^Quite simply, the case was tried before a court that did not have 
jurisdiction.
° Shephard's Citations lists over sixty cases and several law review 
articles which cite Abbot: each of the law review articles cites the 
case in reference to the admissibility of character evidence.
^ Thanks to Brooke Masters for providing this information, including a 
citation to Liberty & Union, by David Herbert Donald, Lexington, MA and 
Toronto; D.C. Heath & Company, 1978, pages 4 and 6.
® A People & A Nation: A History of the United States, Brief Edition, 
Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, et al., Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1988, p. 147.
^ It certainly seems possible that looking at texts of sermons would 
also be useful to this endeavor— but I am not going to do that for this 
paper.
T. Walter Herbert’s Dearest Beloved: The Hawthornes and the Making of 
the Middle-Class Family (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993) will be useful as part of this discussion, too— certainly 
Nathaniel Hawthorne was the published writer, but Sophia's experiences 
with negotiating sexuality and desire and other aspects of adult life 
bear mentioning in this context.
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America in the 1830s was still very much a country in
the process of defining itself. The years 17 50-182 0 saw
political discourse engaging the middle class, as the
American and French Revolutions brought the philosophies of
Locke and Rousseau into everyday conversation. Both
countries struggled to develop workable new political
ideologies. Under pressure from these new ideologies, which
stressed the rights of the individual, men found themselves
having to rationalize gender issues for the first time.
Kenneth A. Lockridge states that
in general and most particularly in colonial 
contexts, patriarchy was under constant 
pressure from many directions— from the 
state, financially, culturally, and in 
specific cases because of the peculiar 
vulnerabilities of colonial situations. From 
this perspective, it was not patriarchy's 
strengths but rather its very vulnerabilitv 
which was vital in maintaining larger 
patriarchal urges to political and 
ideological control right up through the age 
of the democratic revolutions.
The contradictions inherent in Locke and Rousseau's theories
were apparent first at the philosophic level; later they
surfaced at the family level as well. And the contradictions
were not new. One hundred years before the Abbot case,
Mary Astell was already asking, "If absolute Sovereignty be
not necessary in a State, how comes it to be so in a Family?
Or if in a Family, why not in a State? . . . .  if all Men
are born Free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves?"^^.
11
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Many historians of the early republic have discussed various
implications of this dilemma, including Susan Moller Okin:
Just as the freedom, individuality, and rationality of men was beginning to be 
recognized as the foundation for their 
political and legal equality, a change was 
taking place in the sphere of family life 
that had catastrophic implications for the 
future of women's rights and freedoms. But 
the development of the affective or
sentimental family and the idealizing of it
that occurred had serious consequences for 
women.(72)
These consequences are apparent in historical 
documents, as states which had granted women the right to 
vote began disenfranchising female citizens, and in 
literature, where Susanna Rowson, followed by Susan Warner, 
Lydia Maria Child, E.D.E.N. Southworth, and a host of others 
began to branch out from their literary predecessors 
(Richardson, Austen, Bronte, the Shelleys) to explore the 
possibilities (or lack thereof) for young women in a society 
dominated by the the ideal of the Republican Mother. This 
paragon, whose domestic life involved creating an oasis to
which her busy husband might return for sanctuary, and
raising her daughters to do the same, and whose political 
responsibilities involved nothing more or less than raising 
good republican sons, became the embodiment of all feminine 
virtue.
Significantly, there was no sphere for a public 
challenge of these contradictions. As Okin says, "anyone who
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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wished to register objection to the subordinate position of 
women had now to take considerable care not to be branded as 
an enemy of that newly hallowed institution— the sentimental 
family"(Okin, 88). And Linda Kerber notes that "to accept an 
openly acknowledged role for women in the public sector was 
to invite extraordinary hostility and ridicule. Although 
neither political party took a consistent position on the 
matter, hostility to women’s political participation seems 
to have been particularly acute in Federalist circles"^3. 
This left women, especially middle- and upper-class women, 
in a paradoxical bind. Having worked for the Revolution, 
often in traditionally male roles, they now, in many cases, 
found themselves less free than they had been before the 
war, as "the Republican Mother . . . .  was a citizen but not 
really a constituent" (Ffomen of the Republic, 283). The new 
republic was built on a gendered notion of power and 
entitlement.
What does all this suggest about the political climate 
of the 1830s in America? The evolving sentimental family 
idealized a certain role for women, but left very little 
room for negotiation. Working-class women, single women, and 
of course women fighting for social reforms such as the 
Married Woman's Property Act (finally passed in 1848, the 
same year as the convention at Seneca Falls) and 
enfranchisement were all beyond the pale of appropriate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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behavior. For example, when Fanny Wright lectured in the 
United States on "equality for women, emancipation for 
slaves . . . .  free public education for everyone, 
regardless of sex, race, or economic status . . . .she was 
denounced as a 'red harlot,' a 'fallen and degraded fair 
one'" (Gurko, 33). Not only did the development of the 
idealized sentimental family have serious consequences for 
women, it also added another facet to the growing dual 
characterization of women: women outside of the sentimental 
family were dubious characters sexually, morally, and 
politically.
A perfect example of this notion, as Christine Stansell 
suggests, is the Bedlow-Sawyer rape case of 1793: "an 
especially valuable source of information about how men 
could act out and explain to themselves their hostilities 
toward women " . B e d l o w  was charged with the rape of Lanah 
Sawyer, a seventeen-year-old seamstress, and his attorneys 
used the trial to "shift the focus . . . .from the duplicity 
of the seducer to the weak-mindedness of the seduced" 
(Stansell, 24). The strategy was successful. Bedlow was 
acquitted, although the jury's decision was not universally 
popular. Stansell notes that "the intersection of class and 
gender . . . .signified a sexual wantonness that weakened
women's credibility" (Stansell, 26), an effect clearly 
visible in the Abbot case as well.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Marybeth Hamilton's essay, "'The Life of a Citizen in 
the Hands of a Woman,'"15 discusses the fate of working- 
class women who brought complaints for rape before the Court 
of General Sessions in New York City in the period 1790-1820 
generally, and the Bedlow-Sawyer case specifically. While 
there are important differences in the two cases (Henry 
Bedlow was tried in New York City in 1793, and People v. 
Abbot was brought in the western part of the state thirty- 
seven years later) many of Hamilton's conclusions do much to 
explicate and inform a reading of Philena Morehouse's 
experience.
Hamilton explores the ways class inflects a discussion
of women's sexuality; "the women of New York's laboring
class . . . .were made the repositories of all the most
venal qualities the city's upper-class women had shed in
their ascent to ladyhood— their insatiable passions and
grasping, greedy brand of treachery" (Hamilton, 233) . This
was in no way an implicit action, as
in the rowdy male preserves of saloons and 
bawdy houses (terrain frequented by both 
gentlemen and laborers), jokes, songs, and 
tales depicted poor women as greedy whores 
and lusty, manipulative molls, creatures 
whose violent passions led them readily to 
vengefulness and deceit. In such a cynical 
milieu, the way lay open for some men to 
dismiss any refusal as simple apparent 
refusal, and to see force as a legitimate 
weapon in, and indeed inseparable from, 
sexual conquest.(Hamilton, 23 3)
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The extent to which women outside the specific
Republican Wife/Mother role were forced into a sexually
unscrupulous vocabulary seems to become particularly crucial
at this moment:
the Bedlow-Sawyer case was thus transformed 
into a dispute between a citizen and an 
outsider— potent rhetoric in a society where 
the misogyny informing all classes lay as 
well at the heart of the republican political 
theory on which that society had been 
founded. (Hamilton, 246)
Through the shifting and evolving post-revolutionary system
of language, a violent crime becomes a battle over
citizenship. Abigail Adams, in an oft-quoted letter, points
out the misogyny at the heart of republican political theory
("Remember, all men would be tyrants if they could."). That
lurking misogyny rapidly informed post-revolutionary women's
roles, as the Republican Mother became a confining symbol of
patriotism and morality. Enlightenment philosophers were
read and reread, interpreted and reinterpreted, as the first
legislators carefully located women outside the boundaries
of the new nation.
Changing language and vocabulary are not incidental to 
a discussion of a rape opinion, for, as Laurel Thatcher 
Ulrich notes, "eighteenth-century literature became obsessed 
with rape and seduction at the very time legal standards for 
prosecuting such crimes were changing." Also, as Joan 
Hoff Wilson points out, "one of the greatest societal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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setbacks for women was a direct result of legal 
modernization induced by new private and public laws which 
appeared in the United States in the first three decades of 
the nineteenth century".(10)
It is important to consider how the particularities of 
a rural community inflect rape trials as well. In A 
Midvrife ' s Tale Ulrich describes a rape case roughly 
contemporary to the Bedlow-Sawyer case. Rebecca Foster, the 
wife of the minister Isaac Foster, accused several men of 
raping her, as her neighbor, the midwife Martha Ballard, 
recorded in her diary in October 1789: "Mrs Foster has sworn 
a Rape on a number of men among whom is Judge North.
Shocking indeed" (Ulrich, 102). The similarities between the 
rape(s) alleged by Mrs Foster and those alleged by Philena 
Morehouse in People v. Abbot include the nature of life in 
rural communities, the regard in which ministers may be held 
in their communities, and the resonances of class 
difference. Ulrich notes of Rebecca Foster that "except for 
a few cryptic documents in the records of the Supreme 
Judicial Court and a tantalizing set of entries in Martha's 
diary, her story is lost" (104). Ulrich goes on to say that 
Martha Ballard and Rebecca Foster's "reticence is hardly 
surprising, given the rarity of the accusation and the 
severity of the penalty"( 1 1 8 ) . This statement is largely 
true of Philena Morehouse's story as well, but in her case,
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as I will show, the young woman has been completely erased 
by the force of Judge Cowen's opinion, (As Foster's story 
has not been completely lost, appearing as it does in 
Ulrich's book, so too it is possible to reconstruct a 
framework for Philena Morehouse's story: that being the work 
of this essay.) While Rebecca Foster was the wife of the 
local minister, her husband's place in the community was 
tenuous enough once his contract had been cancelled^®. In 
the Abbot case, it is the accused rapist who is the 
minister, possibly lending his defense some weight and 
dignity. Rebecca Foster, like Philena Morehouse, found her 
character under assault, both overtly and implicitly, as 
Martha Ballard writes, "I also testifed that said North said 
to me Last weak [sic] that he really believed Mrs[.] Foster 
was treated as she complains but he never had the least 
reason to suspect her virtue or modesty" (Ulrich, 116). 
Ballard also notes that "on trial Mrs Foster apeard very 
Calm sedate & unmovd notwithstanding the strong atempts 
there were made to throw aspersions on her Carrectir" 
(Ulrich, 117). Unfortunately Martha Ballard was nowhere 
near the Court of Oyer and Terminer the day Philena 
Morehouse testified.
II Kenneth A. Lockridge, "Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace Books of 
William Byrd II and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power in the 
Eighteenth Century," quoted from the unpublished version, 1992, page 2. 
Now published as On the Sources of Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace
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Books of William Byrd and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power in 
the Eighteenth Century, New York; New York University Press, 1992,
Susan Moller Okin, "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family," 
Philosophy and Public p. 72. Her note cites Some Reflections Upon 
Marriage, 1730 edition, pp. 106-107, NY; Source Books, 1970.
Women and the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary 
America, Linda Kerber, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1980; p. 279. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically in the 
text.
Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York 1789- 
1860, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987, p.23. 
^^Hamilton, Marybeth, "‘The Life of a Citizen in the Hands of a Woman’: 
Sexual Assault in New York City, 1790-1820," in New York and the Rise of 
American Capitalism: Economic Development and the Social and Political 
History of an American State, 1780-1870, William Pencak and C. E.
Wright, eds., New York: The New-York Historical Society, 1989.
Subsequent citations will appear parenthetically in the text.
A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on her diary, 
1785-1812, Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, New York: Vintage Books, a division 
of Random House, Inc., 1991: page 386.
"Since rape was a capital crime, justices and grand juries frequently 
reduced the charge in order to get a conviction. Only ten men were tried 
for rape in Massachusetts in the entire eighteenth century, none after 
1780. Between 1780 and 1797 there were sixteen indictments and ten 
convictions for attempted rape, still a small number considering that 
the population of the state approached 400,000" (Ulrich, 118). While 
this may have been the case in Massachusetts, rape was not a capital 
crime in New York in 1837, and these justifications would not apply. It 
was clearly a serious accusation, taken seriously, but by then, as will 
become obvious, there were other reasons for women's reticence.
18 Foster's contract was cancelled in October 1788; he was formally 
dismissed in December 1788. See Ulrich, p. 113.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 .
Based on Philena Morehouse' sworn testimony, the 
following story emerges:
On a rainy Saturday evening in April, 1835, Philena 
Morehouse, a thirteen-year-old indentured servant, was in 
charge of the Abbot children's bedtime. Mrs. Abbot had taken 
her youngest boy and gone to visit her mother earlier in the 
day, expecting to return that evening. But it rained, and 
since she had "poor s h o e s " , 20 Mrs. Abbot was unable to 
return home. As darkness fell, the two older boys, aged nine 
and seven, were in their trundle bed, which stood in its 
usual position next to their father and mother's bed, in the 
corner of the small room where the family also did its 
cooking. The boys' four-year-old sister was in Philena's 
bed, across the room. Around seven or eight o'clock, with 
the children already sound asleep, Philena Morehouse and the 
children's father, Orson Abbot, went to their beds by the 
light of the fire.
The children were still asleep about a half an hour 
later when their father asked Philena^l to come to his bed. 
When she did not respond, Orson Abbot, clad only in his 
shirt, crossed the room, moved his sleeping daughter to the 
"back side" of the bed, and pulled up Philena's shift. She 
tried to keep her legs together, but he pulled them apart
and climbed on top of her. What followed was the first of a
20
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series of rapes and assaults that continued over the next 
two years.
"When he got in the bed," Philena later testified, "I 
told him I did not want to do so." Her refusal had little 
effect, as Abbot "said, 'yes,— it won't do you no hurt.• I 
did not hollow [sic] because I was afraid he would whip 
m e . "22 Although Philena was new to the Abbot household she 
had already formed certain impressions of the inhabitants, 
particularly Orson Abbot. When Abbot asked her to come to 
his bed Philena was not surprised, having thought from 
observing him on the drive home from her previous residence, 
and seeing him about in the community, that his face was 
"kinder mean," and that "he was just such a man" to make 
sexual demands on her.
Philena Morehouse was not a sheltered innocent. She had 
been bound to two families prior to her indenture to the 
Abbots, and had resided in the local poorhouse as well (a 
place to which she had no desire to return). She was 
experienced enough in the ways of her world to make a 
judgment about Orson Abbot, and possessed survival skills 
that prevented her from crying out when Abbot forced himself 
on her.
The rain continued for the next three or four days, and 
Mrs. Abbot remained at her mother's. Abbot "did the same 
thing [to Philena] every night while [Mrs. Abbot] was away."
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Eventually Mrs. Abbot returned, but her presence in the home 
was not enough to protect Philena, as Abbot waylaid the girl 
on a nearby farm in Lyons. Philena resisted, and tried to 
get away, but Abbot took hold of her and pushed her down. 
"When he took hold of me," Philena later testified, "I 
tried to get away from him and told him I did not want to.
He said I must— that it would be no hurt to me."
Abbot continued to rely on the notion that bound 
girls were by their very status sexually available (he 
later told Philena that "all bound girls did just so"), 
and that they are thus impervious to physical or social 
harm. Philena did not give in without a struggle, and 
"continued to resist and try to get away." She was no 
match for Abbot, however. He pushed her down, and held 
her while he took down his pantaloons, and, as Philena 
later recalled, "he had connexion with me and entered 
my person this time— I resisted only a part of the 
time— along at first & towards the last. It was against 
my will."
Abbot was assured and confident of his rights, as at 
first he did not even bother to warn Philena to keep quiet: 
"nothing was said about my not saying anything about it, or 
anything else." There was no need for Philena to keep quiet. 
Abbot probably reasoned, for her tale could surely do him no 
harm. After all, he was a married man and a preacher, and
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she an indentured servant. Philena noted during the trial 
that it was not until a month or so after the first alleged 
rape in the field that Abbot mentioned the necessity of 
keeping silent about his actions: "After we got up he said
I must never tell any body of it, and that if I would not, 
he would make me some nice presents. I said I guessed I 
would not." It is interesting to speculate about what it was 
that caused Abbot, all of a sudden, to try to ensure 
Philena's silence, and about Philena's reasons, at that 
time, for agreeing to do so, but there is no way to know for 
sure. Perhaps his wife had become suspicious. Mrs. Abbot 
would later be instrumental in Philena's departure from the 
Abbot home, under circumstances that suggest she was aware 
of a (seemingly) sexual relationship between her husband and 
the servant. The "nice presents" Abbot promises Philena may 
well have been items that would otherwise have belonged to 
his wife, but the specifics ("sugar candy & raisins," for 
example) are items that Philena could have had no good 
reason for possessing. For a bound girl, any belongings were 
a luxury; luxury belongings themselves were out of the 
question.
At this point, too, twentieth century attitudes collide 
emphatically with nineteenth century expectations. While it 
may be abundantly clear to a modern reader that Philena's 
agreement to keep silent at this point is a result of her
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economic position and her utter powerlessness in the social 
structure she inhabits, a nineteenth-century judge might 
well have heard this testimony and found all his prejudices 
about young working class women confirmed.
Abbot repeatedly waylaid Philena, in the same field and 
in the woods surrounding Lyons. He "coaxed me & promised me 
sugar candy & raisins," she reported, "and told me it would 
do me no hurt," a line of reasoning that is difficult for a 
modern reader to follow at first. Later on in Philena‘s 
testimony, however, her account of Abbot's words renders his 
meaning more explicitly: "he said it would never be any hurt 
to me— that all other bound girls did just so." The "hurt" 
Orson Abbot means is thus revealed to be damage to Philena 
Morehouse's reputation, rather than any physical consequence 
of the rape.
This prolonged sexual assault continued for the
duration of Philena's stay in the Abbot home. And she
was, apparently, offered an opportunity to leave,
although it was probably not a meaningful choice if the
alternative to the Abbot home was the poorhouse. Lyman
Dunning, "one of the Superintendents of the poor of
Wayne County," heard complaints against the Abbots in
the course of his daily work, as he later testified:
After Philena was bound to Abbot complaints 
of her ill treatment that she was set to 
digging potatoes in the spring & not well
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Abbot's to inquire into the truth of t h e m . 23
Mrs. Abbot denied the validity of the complaints, 
apparently saying "they were not true, and that if 
there was anything else, she told the girl to answer 
for herself." Dunning then apparently informed Philena 
that she could leave the Abbots' home if she so chose, 
but that she would have to go back to the poorhouse 
while legal action was taken to "prosecute the 
indentures"24. Philena responded (not entirely 
surprisingly) that she would rather live with the 
Abbots than return to the poorhouse. That hardly seems 
a ringing endorsement, but counsel for the defense 
clearly intended the anecdote to imply consent to 
sexual intercourse,
Philena did eventually leave the Abbots, although 
she was not forced to return immediately to the poor 
house. Several versions of her departure from the 
Abbots' appear in the record of testimony. The disputed 
points seem to be myriad; whether the sometime hired 
man John Lyon was hired well in advance to take Philena 
elsewhere, or on the spur of the moment, after Philena 
was thought to be stealing Mrs. Abbot's belongings; 
whether Philena asked Lyon if she might accompany him 
on a sleigh ride, having no intention of seeking 
shelter elsewhere; whether the Shakers refused to take
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Philena in, or whether she changed her mind about where
she wanted to go. What seems clear from the record is
that Mrs. Abbot finally decided, on a Sunday in
February, 1837, that Philena Morehouse should not
continue to live under her roof. Philena's testimony
outlines her perception of the manner in which she left
the Abbot household:
I left Abbots on Sunday. I was sent away from 
there by Mrs. Abbot. Mr. Abbot did not say I 
must go away. Mr. John Lyon took me away. Mrs 
Abbot employed Lyon to take me away. Mr.
Abbot was gone to meeting when Mrs. Abbot 
employed Lyon to take me away. It was 
arranged between Mrs. Abbot and Lyon that I should be taken to the Shakers.
The plot thickens. Mrs. Abbot was obviously no fool. Whether
she arranged for Philena’s departure to protect the girl, or
her marriage, or out of revenge against a young woman who
was distracting her husband from his marriage vows, it is
clear that she thought she had good reason to wish Philena
gone.
Lyons' version presents Philena's departure somewhat 
differently. According to his testimony, John Lyon arrived 
at the Abbot home on his way to the nearby Shaker community. 
He offered to take Philena with him for a sleigh ride if 
Mrs. Abbot would make sure she was dressed warmly. He and 
Mrs. Abbot had had some previous conversation about getting 
Philena out of the household, ostensibly because Mrs. Abbot 
considered Philena to be dishonest. Philena, preparing to
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leave, threw a little bundle tied up in a handkerchief into 
John Lyon's cutter and went upstairs to put on her warm 
clothes. Mrs. Abbot retrieved the bundle and opened it onto 
the bed, displaying "two pair of silk gloves, a couple of 
finger rings, a piece of Calico half a yard or a yard, a 
piece of silk braid, and some thread, some garden seeds." 
According to Lyon, Mrs. Abbot had previously noticed that 
these items were missing, but whether she suspected Philena 
of stealing them or her husband of giving trinkets to the 
bound girl is unclear. Philena would not confess to stealing 
the things, even after Lyon threatened her with jail. And 
the catalogue of items, as reported by John Lyon, is 
particularly damning; what reason could there be for Philena 
Morehouse, indentured servant, to possess silk gloves? The 
fact remains that, to make sure of the bound girl's 
departure, Mrs. Abbot completed the transaction in her 
husband's absence.
After she left the Abbott household, Philena stayed 
with the William Pullen family, and Mrs. Pullen was the 
first person she told about Orson Abbot raping her. Mrs. 
Pullen may have encouraged Philena to take Abbot to court, 
for in April 1837, Philena Morehouse brought charges against 
Orson Abbot before James Edwards, a local judge or 
magistrate. Edwards sent Philena's case to Theron Strong, 
the district attorney for Wayne County.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 28 - Blank
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
On April 24, 1837, Orson Abbot was indicted at a Grand 
Jury hearing before the local Court of Oyer and Terminer (a 
court which had jurisdiction in criminal proceedings) with 
Daniel Moseley, a local circuit judge, presiding. Abbot's 
indictment is signed in the name of Theron R. Strong, 
District Attorney.
Theron Rudd Strong (1802-1873) was the District 
Attorney for Wayne County, New York, and acted on Philena 
Morehouse's behalf. He was a member of a family with a long 
history of distinguished legal work. He was born in 
Salisbury, Connecticut on November 7, 1802, and began his 
law practice in Palmyra, New York, in 1826. Strong became 
District Attorney in 1831, and went on to be elected Justice 
of the Supreme Court of New York in 1851, after serving in 
Congress and as a member of the State Assembly. His ancestor 
Elder John Strong, or John the Puritan, was one of the first 
settlers of Northampton, Massachusetts, and the Long Island 
branch of the Strong family also produced a number of 
notable historical figures. Theron Strong's cousin Justice 
Selah Brewster Strong (1787-1872), in fact, wrote the 
opinion for the court in People v. Jackson (1857)25^ a case 
I will discuss at some length later.
The indictment against Abbot was filed three days after 
the hearing. Moseley was Circuit Judge of the Seventh 
Circuit of the State of New^^ork, and serving with him at
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the hearing were four judges of the County Courts of common
pleas and General Sessions; William Sisson, Theodore
Partridge, Daniel Poppins, and Marvin Rich. These four men,
at least, would have been local residents and familiar with
the community. The charge was presented to them (the Grand
Jury) as follows:
that Orson Abbot late of the town of Sodus 
in the County of Wayne. . . .on the first
day of April in the year of our lord one
thousand eight hundred and thirty five 
with force and arms. . . .  in and upon one 
Philena Morehouse in the peace of God and 
of the said People [of New York] then and 
there being, forcibly, violently and 
feloniously did make an assault, and her 
the said Philena Morehouse, then and there 
forcibly, violently and against her will 
feloniously did ravish and carnally know 
against the peace of the people of the 
State of New York and their dignity.26
And the jurors also presented the charge that "the said
Orson Abbot" had committed the same offense on numerous
occasions in the next two years27. orson Abbot was further
alleged to have "beat[en], wound[ed], and ill treat[ed] with
intent" Philena Morehouse on October 1, 1835 and October 1,
1836, "to the great damage of the said Philena and against
the Peace of the People of the State of New York and their
dignity". It is striking that the charge is presented as
not only an attempt to right alleged wrongs on behalf of an
individual, but also on behalf of "the People of the State
of New York and their dignity*' (italics mine) . The
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allegation of an assault against an intangible ideal is not 
merely rhetorical in nature, and is quite different from 
rape cases which are presented as an assault against a man's 
property. In the Bedlow-Sawyer case, as well, the 
prosecuting attorney "stressed the violation not of a 
woman's will, but of her honor; rape thus was hateful as a 
perversion of each man's duty to protect chaste and helpless 
females" (Hamilton, 229). The "chaste and helpless female" 
was, however, not likely to be present in the courtroom when 
the prosecutrix was an indentured servant. As we have seen, 
class position inflected the reputations of all bound girls, 
though to what extent this was a definition utilized by 
unscrupulous employers (as a method of persuasion) is 
unclear. The inclusion of the offense against "the People of 
the State of New York and their dignity," then, serves to 
counterbalance the negative effect of the prosecutrix's 
class status.
The record continues with an exact copy of the 
indictment, as it must have been read in court that day, and 
concludes:
And afterwards. . . .on the twenty seventh 
day of April in the year one thousand eight 
hundred and thirty seven at the Court of Oyer 
and Terminer and Jail delivery aforesaid, 
held at the Court house in the town of Lyons 
in the County aforesaid before the Circuit 
Judge and the other judges aforesaid comes 
the said Orson Abbot in his own proper 
person, and having heard the said indictment
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not guilty of the premises in the said 
indictment alleged against him as in and by 
the said indictment is above set forth, and 
thereupon he puts himself upon the country 
and Theron R. Strong Esquire District 
Attorney who presents for the people in this behalf doth do likewise.
So, in other words, Orson Abbot pleaded not guilty, and 
"afterwards the said Indictment for certain reasons was sent 
by the said Court of Oyer and Terminer and Jail Delivery to, 
and received by the Court of General Sessions of the peace 
held at the court house" in Lyons, New York, "to be tried 
according to law, and the directions of the statute 
provided.
This, in fact, is the action on which the Supreme Court 
of Judicature decision turns. Before 1847, the question of 
jurisdiction on the New York State court system seems to 
have been quite difficult to follow. District Attorney 
Theron Strong could have prosecuted Orson Abbot for rape 
before the court of Oyer and Terminer, or he could have 
prosecuted Abbot on the assault and battery charges before 
the Court of General Sessions. The rules of jurisdiction did 
not allow Strong to prosecute Abbot for rape before the 
Court of General Sessions, and this error proved enough to 
reverse Abbot's conviction. Whatever the "certain reasons" 
were that prompted the district attorney to send the case to 
the Court of General Sessions, they weren't good enough. The 
trial began, in the wrong court, on May 25, 1837.
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The details of the alleged assaults appear in the 
record of Philena Morehouse's testimony, as it was set down 
by the clerk of the Courts of Common Pleas and General 
Sessions, Cullen Foster. The pattern of the assaults affords 
modern readers a fairly detailed picture of Philena's daily 
existence, as Abbot seems to have laid in wait for her on 
every path and behind every bush in the Lyons/Sodus area, as 
well as lurking in the haymow. Marybeth Hamilton notes that 
"women were attacked. . . .not on extraordinary excursions 
into the city's unfamiliar nether reaches, but in the most 
mundane of settings, in the same locations in which they 
lived and worked, and as they went about their everyday 
chores and pleasures."(231) As we have seen, Philena 
Morehouse was first attacked in a place that was at once 
familiar and unfamiliar— her own bed, "about a week after 
she went to live with [Abbot]." Even that is problematic, 
however, for it was not her own bed, but rather the bed set 
aside for her use by the Abbot family, and belonging, as did 
everything in the home, to Orson A b b o t . 2 9
Philena Morehouse’s testimony, as recorded by the 
clerk, exhibits little surprise or outrage at the events 
that had allegedly occurred. As presented in the bill of 
exceptions, (a record, admittedly, allowing for little 
emotional expression) she was able to provide a matter-of- 
fact account of events. The clerk of courts did, however.
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manage to record some of the flavor of the testimony of 
other witnesses; when the Van Maters, Philena's former 
employers, testify, their dislike of Philena is apparent in 
every word as they faithfully report every nasty bit of 
gossip about their former servant, Philena seems, from the 
records, to have had no hesitation about admitting her lack 
of resistance or outcry during Abbot's attacks. This 
admission may have resonated quite differently when she 
testified in the local court than it read, as part of the 
bill of exceptions, in the Supreme Court of Judicature 
hearing. This may have been an occasion when Abbot's 
reputation within the community worked against him in a 
court made up of members of that community. The jury's 
knowledge of Orson Abbot the person may have outweighed 
problematic testimony on Philena's part.
There seems to have been little conversation between 
Philena and Abbot until the third night, when "the defendant 
said he wanted I should do every thing he wanted me to do, 
and always obey him. This was after he got out of my bed. He 
said nothing further."
Reading further into the bill of exceptions, the fact 
that a jury convicted Abbot becomes more surprising, given 
the prevailing cultural values. Again, it may be that 
Abbot's reputation at the local level weighed heavily 
enough with the jury to overshadow some of the most
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surprising aspects of Philena's testimony. The record of 
her testimony regarding the first rape continues (italics 
mine):
It hurt when he put some thing into me. I was 
not bloody. There was no blood on my clothes 
or on the sheets. I did not scream nor cry. I 
am sure he entered my body. I was not lame the next day.
It seems extraordinary that this revelation was not 
enough to prove that Philena had been sexually active and 
was therefore unrapeable. There are no indications that 
anyone in the courtroom made an effort to continue this line 
of investigation until the close of testimony. Her testimony 
continues with details of the incidents outside the home.
There also seems to have been a series of questions
related to Philena's disclosure of the rape(s). The record
of her testimony suggests that she maintained a positive
front within the community, but is not clear as to her
reasons for choosing Mrs. Pullen as her confidante. Philena
also has her own reasons for not telling people about the
rapes, as she states again and again:
I told John Lyon that Mr. Abbott always used 
me well because I did not want to tell him. I 
have never said I liked to live at Abbotts. I 
don't recollect telling Mercy Foster so. I 
told old Mrs. Hughson [Mrs. Abbott's mother]
I liked to live at Abbots, but I did not like 
to live there.
Since John Lyon seems to have been Mrs. Abbot's ally in the 
accusations of theft, it would have been quite odd had
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Philena chosen him as her confidante. While Philena also
seems to have been caught fibbing to Mrs. Abbot's mother,
neither of these dissimulations appeared to the court as
serious offenses against truth and veracity. At the local
level, the jury seems to have been remarkably alert to the
nuances of Philena's situation, overlooking ostensible gray
areas in her testimony and focusing on Abbot's actions
rather than Philena's. The issue of who Philena told about
the rape(s) and when she told them is a problematic one as
far as the attorneys were concerned, however, as the record
suggests that related questions were put on a number of
occasions during the trial. Philena admits that
two or three of my brothers and my father 
came [to Abbotts] while I lived there— one of 
my brothers was there about a month after the 
first time he had connexion with me. I did 
not tell them about it, nor did I tell any 
body else till after I left there. Lyman 
Dunning one of the Superintendents of the 
poor who bound me to Abbott called there 
while I was there and asked me, if I was 
dissatisfied. I told him I was not, I dare 
not tell him I was dissatisfied. Mrs. Abbott 
was by while he asked me.
Certainly it seems unlikely that Philena would have felt
comfortable confiding in an authority figure while her
employer (and the wife of the alleged rapist) was standing
right there. It is not as clear why she felt unable to
confide in her brothers or her father, but as the family
seems to have been separated for some time, the relationship
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may not have been in any way traditionally familial. (From 
the records available, there seems to have been no time when 
all members of the family lived together in their own home.) 
Later questions suggest that Abbott's lawyer tried to 
determine whether Philena had been put up to bringing the 
charge by any of her relatives. Philena testifies that she 
was brought to court by her uncle, Mr. Cephas Fields, but 
assured the court that he had not told her what to testify, 
nor had anyone else.
Philena concludes this section of her testimony by 
noting that Orson Abbot "told me he thought I would be sorry 
if I went to the Shakers." This could be read as a veiled 
threat, or, possibly, as a sign that Abbot knew Philena well 
enough to know where she would certainly not fit in. It 
certainly suggests that Philena had discussed the 
possibility of leaving with Orson Abbot. There seems to have 
been no follow-up to the statement.
And then, amid all the recorded answers, Philena 
apparently responds to a question: "I knew William Cooper^0 
while I lived at Van Mater's. He lived at Van Maters & was 
hired man there a month while I lived there." This response 
seems oddly out of place, and, equally oddly, unaccompanied 
by further investigation. A series of questions, not 
recorded by the clerk of courts, seem to have been put with 
the express design of casting doubt on Philena Morehouse as
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a credible witness, and, more broadly, establishing whether 
she is in fact entitled to the protection of the court in 
this matter. There seems to have been a parade of witnesses 
eager to cast doubt on Philena's reputation, including 
several of her former employers. Strong's objection to a 
direct question (ostensibly referring to Cooper) later 
provides Abbot's lawyer basis for the appeal.
The trial concluded with a parade of witnesses, 
including Philena's former employers and neighbors, all 
offering character testimony, both good and bad. David Van 
Mater testified that while Philena lived with him and his 
family, "she was not a girl of truth. . . . The general 
speech of people, while she was at my house. . . .was, that 
she was an impudent girl about chastity.
One of the last witnesses called was James Edwards, the 
magistrate before whom Philena first brought rape charges 
against Abbot. Here at last is a follow-up to Philena's 
testimony about the absence of blood on the sheets. Abbot's 
attorney bluntly asks James Edwards "Did Philena testify 
before you on her Examination that she had had connexion 
with any other persons before she went to live at Abbotts?" 
Theron Strong immediately objected, and the court did not 
allow the question. The defense counsel "excepted to the 
decision excluding the said question," thereby preserving 
the point for appeal.
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The jury proceeded to find Orson Abbot guilty of 
assault and battery. Following the seals of Judges Sisson, 
Partridge, Poppins and Rich, there is a note reading, "I 
hereby certify that there is so much doubt as to render it 
expedient to take the Judgment of the Supreme Court on the 
within Bill of Exceptions," signed by William Sisson.
In the account of the trial before the Supreme Court of
Judicature, the court reporter, John L. Wendell, fills in a
few more of the blanks from the local trial and provides an
additional account of Philena Morehouse's cross-examination:
On the trial at the sessions the prosecutrix, 
on whom the rape was charged to have been 
committed, and who testified as a witness in support of the prosecution, on her cross- 
examination was asked whether she had ever
had carnal connection with any person other
than the defendant previous to her connection 
with him. The district attorney objected to 
the question, and the court decided that it 
should not be put, and overruled the same.
The counsel for the defendant asked the 
magistrate before whom the complaint was made 
whether the prosecutrix testified before him, 
on her examination, that she had connection 
with any person before she had connection 
with the defendant: this question was also 
objected to and overruled (People v. Abbot,
192) .
This line of questioning should be all too familiar to 
anyone acquainted with the modern issues of admissibility of 
evidence in rape trials. The counsel for the defense 
employed familiar strategy, that of balancing the alleged 
rapist's 'fine' reputation in the community against the word
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of a woman of 'doubtful' reputation, as we learn from 
Wendell's introductory notes to the case as it was presented 
on appeal:
The defendant was a married man and a preacher of 
the gospel; his counsel inquired of a female 
witness (Mercy Foster) who had resided in his 
house a portion of the time during which the 
prosecutrix alleged that the defendant had 
intercourse with her, whether she had ever 
observed any immodest intercourse or any improper 
familiarity between the defendant and the 
prosecutrix. This question was also overruled 
(People V. Abbot, 192).
Here, too, Orson Abbot's attorney attempted to cast
doubt on Philena Morehouse's character; more
specifically, the question put to Mercy Foster (and
subsequently overruled by Daniel Moseley) is designed
to produce the impression that whatever it was that
happened to Philena Morehouse, she brought it on
herself by "improper familiarity":
The defendant having adduced some evidence 
slightly impeaching the character of the 
prosecutrix for truth and veracity, offered 
to prove that her character in that respect 
was bad six or seven years previous to the 
trial: to the introduction of which testimony 
the district attorney objected, and the same 
was excluded by the court. The defendant 
excepted to these several decisions, and the 
question submitted to this court arose upon 
these exceptions (People v. Abbot, 192).
The case, then, went on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Judicature in 1837. Now it would be Esek 
Cowen's turn.
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25 3 Parker C. R. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1857)
26 agg Supreme Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031,
New York State Archives).
2^ June 1, 1835; August 1, 1835; October 1, 1835; December 1, 1835;
February 1, 1836; April 1, 1836; June 1, 1836; August 1, 1836;
October 1, 1836; December 1, 1836; and on February 1, 1837, see Supreme 
Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031, New York State 
Archives).
28 agg Supreme Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031, 
New York State Archives).
29 I am grateful to Nancy Cook for this insight.
20 Philena Morehouse seems to have been suspected of having a sexual 
relationship with William Cooper. Details of the accusation are scarce, 
mostly contained in innuendo and in the way certain c[uestions are 
framed.
31 ggg Supreme Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031, 
New York State Archives).
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Judge Esek Cowen (1787-1844)32 a well-known and
well-respected member of the legal profession in New York.
The inventory of his law library shows a collection
containing approximately 2800 volumes, which made it the
most extensive and valuable law library in the country at
the time was advertised for s a l e . 33 His form b o o k 34  ̂ begun
in 1806 when Cowen was nineteen, is an excellent example of
the way a good nineteenth-century lawyer built up his
knowledge of forms and statutes and effective statements of
legal points. It even contains several entries on proper
methods of figuring costs to be awarded. Cowen is described
as an "eminent j u r i s t " 3 5  and "his opinions, it was said,
were 'not excelled by those of any judge in England or
America,* in their 'depth and breadth of research and their
strength of reasoning'" (Chester, 1103). The death of "the
excellent and learned Esek Cowen" in 1844 caused "the
judiciary, the bar, and the State" to suffer "an almost
irreparable l o s s . "36 Proctor continues his paean to Cowen:
His vast legal knowledge, his intimate 
acquaintance with precedent, his wonderfully 
retentive memory, his unceasing industry, his 
love of research, gave him the reputation of 
being one of the most erudite judges in the 
nation.... It caused him to trace every 
principle of law to its fountain head— to 
describe every variation and restriction in 
its course, modifying or neutralizing its 
force and meaning...In many respects, he was 
to the American bar what Mansfield was to the
English.(Proctor, 385-6)
42
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Cowen worked with his friend, Nicholas Hill, one 
of the most famous ’’special p l e a d e r s ” ^7 of the day, to 
produce an important reference text, Cowen & Hill’s 
Notes to Phillips on Evidence. (Cowen’s son Sidney 
seems to have continued both his father's friendship 
with Hill and the working relationship, and worked on 
later editions of the Notes.) Esek Cowen's opinions 
were famous, as L. B. Proctor notes: "His legal 
opinions are the trophies— the imperishable monuments 
of his great judicial powers; they have been criticised 
for their length, their prolixity, and their 
discursiveness, but those faults, if indeed they can be 
considered faults, are the result of his great 
profundity” (385-6). Were it not for Cowen's 
discursiveness. People v. Abbot would be simply another 
entry in Wendell's Reports^®.
Judge Cowen's opinion for the court in People v. Abbot 
is rich with cultural history. The breadth of its author's 
education is readily apparent in a wealth of literary and 
religious allusion; contemporary attitudes toward women, 
especially as regarding their place in society, are equally 
apparent. Even accounting for connotations which may have 
evolved considerably over 150 years, a late twentieth- 
century reader will be struck by the force of the language
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Judge Cowen employs against this plaintiff in particular, 
and women seeking the protection of the court in g e n e r a l .39 
The familiar line of questioning utilized by Abbot's 
lawyers as they attempted to use evidence of bad character 
to discredit Philena Morehouse's story caught Judge Cowen's 
attention. While his colleague in the court of Oyer and 
Terminer had overruled several of the questions aimed at 
Philena Morehouse's reputation, and while these questions 
ultimately had no bearing on his decision, Esek Cowen felt 
compelled to discuss their relevance. Given his views on the 
subject, it is clear that Judge Cowen would have allowed the 
questions :
The question to the prosecutrix herself, 
whether she had not had previous criminal connection with other men, was, I think, 
proper, assuming, as we do at present, that 
the defendant could be considered on trial 
either on the charge of rape, or for an 
assault and battery with intent to commit 
that crime. (People v. Abbot, 192-3)
Note that the judge has transformed the original
question, "had she had connection with any person before she
had connection with the defendant," to "whether she had not
had criminal connection with other men" (italics mine).
While the two may have been nearly synonymous in Wayne
County, New York, in 1837, the resonance of the phrase
"criminal connection" is quite different from an unadorned
"connection", seeming far more calculated and deliberate, a
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real threat to the fabric of society. "Criminal connection" 
also has quite a different set of connotations than does the 
phrase "carnal connection," again regardless of whether the 
two may have been nearly identical in meaning to a 
nineteenth-century audience.
As language has changed dramatically over the last 
hundred years, so too was it in flux during the post­
revolutionary era, as Cynthia Jordan reads
the after-effects of the American Revolution 
on language and on attitudes toward language; 
to suggest, in particular, the complex links 
between language and authority, and language 
and power, that came to exist in the minds of 
the men who first shaped this country and that led them so often to 'unfix' the 
traditional meanings of the words they used 
in response to their 'new circumstances'
What Jordan names 'unfixing' is the startled reaction of the
men who based their Revolution on Enlightenment
philosophies, upon discovering that those very philosophies
empowered several interested groups whom the leaders of the
Revolution had not intended to empower. As one can see from
documents such as the Essex R e s u l t ^ l ,  a good deal of energy
was hastily devoted to excluding women, and men without
property, and to layering gendered and class-based language
and entitlements over the Revolutionary ideal. Cowen,
perhaps in response to the shifting meanings around him,
chooses strong, biblically-linked, unambiguous language to
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express his reading of the proper rape v i c t i m ^ 2̂  but employs 
the unstable language to his benefit as well. Cowen 
continues:
In such a case the material issue is on the 
willingness or reluctance of the prosecutrix- 
-an act of the mind...The prosecutrix is 
usually, as here, the sole witness to the 
principal facts, and the accused is put to 
rely for his defence on circumstantial 
evidence. (People v. Abbot, 194)
To a late twentieth century reader, the weight of this
comment is to render implicit the contention that a
thirteen-year-old female servant could not possibly be
a trustworthy witness. Implicit as well is the fear
that any woman could bring an unfounded charge of rape,
and the man so charged would be powerless to defend
hims e l f . C o w e n  also describes "the willingness or
reluctance of the prosecutrix" as "an act of the mind,"
although determining willingness or reluctance is based
on a physical act:
Any fact tending to the inference that there 
was not the utmost reluctance and the utmost 
resistance is always received. That there was 
not an immediate disclosure, that there was 
no outcry, though aid was at hand and that 
known to the prosecutrix, that there are no 
indications of violence to the person, are 
put as among the circumstances of defence; 
not as conclusive but as throwing distrust 
upon the assumption that there was a real 
absence of assent. (People v. Abbot, 194)
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Judge Cowen's slippery linguistic feat has rendered 
equivalent "utmost resistance" with "a real absence of 
a s s e n t . I n  her testimony, Philena's response to the issue 
of her failure to cry out was that she was afraid Abbot 
would whip her. Cowen would have seen this response, as it 
is contained in the bill of exceptions, the set of documents 
sent by the Court of General Sessions to the Supreme Court 
of Judicature. And aid, in the form of the three small Abbot 
children asleep in the same room, seems at best a temporary 
relief. There may have been a family living in another part 
of the Abbots' house; it is unclear whether they were home 
at the time. That Philena Morehouse was without economic 
assets and dependent for room and board on the alleged 
rapist (that she was a bound girl with all that implies) and 
that she was only thirteen years old at the time of the 
first alleged assault has, apparently, no bearing upon the 
case. Certainly, as Marybeth Hamilton (among others) has 
shown, in an urban setting girls as young as six years old 
were the target of forced sexual activity^S; a thirteen- 
year-old is at quite an advanced age, given those 
conditions. Sir Matthew Hale, the distinguished British 
jurist, set ten years as the age at which a female person 
could consent to sexual intercourse. Indenture papers, 
however, usually served to bind a young man or woman to an 
adult household until at least the age of eighteen, implying
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attainment of majority at that age and not before, at least 
for certain purposes. Judge Cowen again:
the connection must be absolutely against the 
will; and are we to be told that previous 
prostitution shall not make one among those 
circumstances which raise a doubt of assent? 
that the triers should be advised to make no 
distinction between the virgin and a tenant 
of the stew? between one who would prefer 
death to pollution, and another who, incited 
by lust and lucre, daily offers her person to 
the other sex? {People v. Abbot, 194)
Sexual intercourse (or rape) becomes "prostitution";
"connection" becomes "criminal connection". The
transformation of the language itself seems designed to
place the worst possible light on any expression of female
sexuality outside marriage (again, it is awkward for modern
readers to realize that it was appropriate, in the eyes of
nineteenth-century jurists, to discuss female sexuality in
relation to rape). Judge Cowen seemingly anticipated this
interpretation :
Shall I be answered that an isolated instance 
of criminal connection does not make a common 
prostitute? I answer, yes; it only makes a 
prostitute. . . .but no court can overrule
the law of human nature^®, which declares 
that one who has already started on the road 
of prostitution, would be less reluctant to 
pursue her way, than another who yet remains 
at her home of innocence, and looks upon such 
a career with horror. (People v. Abbot,
196)
Cowen's condemnation has thus translated one hypothetical 
instance of premarital or extramarital "connection" into the
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beginning of a career in prostitution. Philena Morehouse had 
no "home of innocence"; she had been an indentured servant 
in other people's homes from the age of ten or eleven (and 
before that, apparently, had lived at the poorhouse with her 
father and brothers). This absence of a traditional 
upbringing (read innocence) was enough to brand Philena 
Morehouse sexually available, and from there it was but a 
short step to regarding her as a "common prostitute".
And why not? Sexually available women were a 
temptation to respectably married men. Rape was no longer a 
capital crime in New York State^®, so a charge of rape did 
not mean, as it had in the early republic, that "the life of 
a citizen [rested] in the hands of a woman" (Hamilton, 246). 
It was instead a potential threat to the unity of the 
republican family. Women who appeared, in nineteenth century 
terms, to choose to be sexually active outside of marriage 
had to be "inspired by lust and lucre".
As Philena Morehouse surely discovered during her time 
in the various courts, her appearance and past conduct were 
desperately important;
Why? Because in the practised vendor of bad 
coin or bad bills we more readily infer a 
guilty knowledge than in the novice. (People 
V. Abbot, 194)
This is by no means a minor point. Issues of disclosure 
continue to be very important, for as Cowen noted, knowledge
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of human nature might well suggest that a witness who has
previously perjured him or herself might well do so again; a
person who has stolen might well do so again. The question
of how much a jury is entitled to know is a question Cowen
emphasizes repeatedly;
And will you not more readily infer assent in 
the practised Messalina, in loose attire, 
than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?
Both knowledge and assent are affections of 
the mind, and the mode of proving both, rests 
on the same principle in the philosophy of 
evidence. (People v. Abbot, 194)
The choice of Messalina as metaphor for the sexually 
active woman is particularly telling. The ravenous, 
consuming wife of Claudius, set in opposition to Lucretia, 
wife of Tarquin, is another symbolically loaded emblem of 
the demon woman versus the epitome of chastity and purity, 
and one which was certainly familiar to Cowen's 
contemporaries. ^0 ^^y classically-educated nineteenth- 
century man would have been familiar with Tacitus' Annales, 
and would not have needed to spend any time unpacking this 
allusion.(The rhetorical question cited above appears in 
most citations of the case, as Cowen's language resonates in 
contemporary discussions of the admissibility of character 
evidence in rape trials.) Again, slippery language results 
in a familiar equation: knowledge = assent. There seems to 
have been no language for forced sexual intercourse within 
marriage or when the woman in question was not a middle- or
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upper-class member of society of unsullied reputation AND a 
virgin:
Why is this? Because there is not so much 
probability that a common prostitute or the 
prisoner's concubine would withhold her 
assent, as one less depraved; and may I not 
ask, does not the same probable distinction 
arise between one who has already submitted 
herself to the lewd embraces of another, and 
the coy and modest female, severely chaste 
and instinctively shuddering at the thought 
of impurity? Shall I be answered that both 
are equally under the protection of the 
law?(People v. Abbot, 194)
Although Cowen goes on to admit that both are indeed 
equally under the protection of the law, he does so 
grudgingly and conditionally. The familiar virgin/whore 
dichotomy is explicitly at work in Cowen's universe: "shall 
the triers make no distinction between a virgin and a tenant 
of the stew?" The fact of Philena Morehouse's status as a 
"bound girl" further complicates the dichotomy with issues 
of class status, but these are twentieth century issues and 
almost certainly would not have entered into Cowen's 
conscious interpretation of the situation.
If a woman's family was not in good standing in the 
community, as in the Foster case, her marital status seems 
not to have been enough to validate her claim. Mrs Foster's 
allegations thus led inevitably to attacks on her virtue and 
"Carrectir". Rape opinions from Abbot (in 1837) to Carey 
(in 1909) to the present^^ show that post-revolutionary
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America defined a standard of behavior and morality, which 
holds today, to be applied whenever a woman sought the 
protection of the court.
As I have said before. Abbot is a fascinating case
precisely because of the absolute irrelevance of the most
influential part of the opinion, the sections cited above
which have had considerable impact on issues of evidence in
rape law.52 After reading Judge Cowen's opinion I have been
able to consider questions about nineteenth-century men's
attitudes toward women's sexuality (in an arena where the
discussion, sparked as it was by charges of rape, should not
have had anything to do with sexuality), and issues of class
in sexual assault. In the final analysis, however, none of
these things mattered:
there is another reason why judgment against 
the defendant must be withheld; or if 
rendered, why he must be discharged from it.
The court below had no jurisdiction of this 
indictment. . . .The imprisonment may be for
life, on conviction of a rape. . . .To
warrant a trial at the sessions, the district 
attorney should have entered a nolle prosequi 
53on the numberous counts for rape. The issue 
tried here was general on all the counts, the 
jury and witnesses were sworn, and the 
verdict rendered on that issue. The whole was 
coram non j u d i c e and void. Not a witness 
could be indicted for perjury; nor could any 
effectual judgment be rendered, or execution 
issued.
Here is Cowen's decision, in one paragraph. There has been a 
procedural error; regardless of anything else that occurred.
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the trial took place before the wrong court and must be
considered void. Having ruled, however, Cowen continues:
I know not to what extent the evidence was 
intended to be placed before us. There is 
vastly more in the bill of exceptions than 
was necessary to raise the points of law 
proposed by counsel. I will only say, that if 
the district attorney should think he cannot 
make more of this case than what we are able 
to see, he had better not try this man again 
upon the present indictment. I should very 
much doubt on the evidence, whether he has 
been guilty even of a simple assault and 
battery. Upon that matter, however, we cannot 
advise finally, for want of knowing what 
there may be left out of the case. It is our 
proper province merely to pronounce on the 
questions of law (People v. Abbot, 200).
If it is the "proper province [of the Supreme Court of
Judicature] merely to pronounce on the questions of law,"
why does Cowen comment at all? He must have known that his
opinions were held in very high regard. If there were some
reason to lash out at the Wayne County district attorney,
surely there was a more appropriate forum. The vehemence of
these closing remarks reinforce my feeling that there is
much more at stake for Cowen than the fate of a teenage
bound girl and her employer (or saving the state of New York
the cost of bringing the case again in the proper, lower-
level court).
One possible reading of this section of the opinion is 
that Esek Cowen, whose form book shows the detailed and 
methodical way he prepared to become a lawyer himself, did
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not suffer fools gladly, and considered a procedural error 
the mark of a fool. Someone as committed to preparation as 
Cowen may well have perceived Strong's error as a sign that 
he was an incompetent lawyer. In any case, Cowen chose a 
very public and lasting forum in which to deliver his 
lecture.
His language suggests that Cowen also perceives a real
threat in 'unworthy' women seeking the protection of the
court; that for him the "Female Monster," to borrow Susan
Gubar's term, is a sexually active woman, motivated by
desire (or economic necessity) and under the control of no
man. Cowen concludes the opinion with a set of directions
for the Wayne County district attorney, and the implicit
comment that the whole issue would be better off dropped:
There must be a re-trial, if we may be
allowed to so speak in a case where there
has, as yet, been no trial at all; and if the 
counts for rape be not abandoned, the cause 
must be tried by the oyer and terminer.
(People V. Abbot, 200)
This must have been a crushing blow to Philena 
Morehouse. Regardless of the truth of the matter, her 
status in the community was such that, regardless of 
Abbot's conviction at the local level, bringing an 
ultimately inconclusive charge of rape against her 
employer would probably ruin her reputation in the 
community forever more. As someone who depended on her
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employability for survival, Philena Morehouse probably
suffered economic hardship (again) as a result of
Cowen's decision. I don't know yet what happened to her
or to the case after this. Orson Abbot's conviction
was at least temporarily reversed; the district
attorney was shown to have made important procedural
errors, and in summarizing his position one of the most
learned and well-respected jurists of the era delivered
himself of the opinion that "I should very much doubt
on the evidence, whether [Abbot] has been guilty even
of a simple assault and battery". L. B. Proctor said of
Cowen's opinions that
the lawyer, the student, the scholar, those
who love the learning of the bar, those who
admire judicious and philosophic arguments, 
and possess the industry to seek for them, 
will find in the opinions of Judge Cowen, 
legal Golcondas glowing with richest gems of 
erudition. (Proctor, 385-6)
Judge Cowen's opinion in the Abbot case glows with the
intensity and weight of early nineteenth century American
literature, history, and culture. His perception of the
issues implicit and explicit in a rape case, and his
gendered reading of the purview of the court itself provide
brief but telling glimpses of the structure upon which late
twentieth-century law and culture rest. Indeed, it is the
very "length, prolixity, and discursiveness" which annoyed
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some of his colleagues that render Cowen's opinions 
invaluable to a modern-day reader.
Records differ on the date of Cowen's birth, some sources giving 1784 
and others 1787. The History of the Bench and Bar of New York states 
that he "ranked among the foremost lawyers and judges of New York state. 
Early obtaining marked recognition as a practitioner, he was appointed 
in 1823 reporter to the Supreme Court, retaining the position until 
1828. During the period of his service he produced seven volumes of 
reports. In 1828 he was appointed judge of the 4th circuit in place of 
Reuben H. Walworth, who was made chancellor. In 1836 he became associate 
justice of the Supreme Court, filling the position with distinguished 
ability until 1844. He was author of "Civil Jurisdiction of Justices of 
the Peace," and, in connection with Nicholas Hill, of "Notes to 
Phillips' Evidence," a standard book of reference on that branch of the 
law" <McAdam, p. 288).
Catalogue of the Law Library of Judge Esek Cowen, in the Special 
Collections Department of the Harvard Law School Library.
^^Also in the Special Collections Department of the Harvard Law School 
Library.
Courts and Lawyers of New York, A History 1609-1925, by Alden Chester 
(New York and Chicago; The American Historical Society, Inc., 1925) 
volume III. Subsequent citations will appear parenthetically in the 
text.
^^The Bench and Bar of New-York, by L. B. Proctor (New York: Diossy & 
Company, 1870), 385.
L. B. Proctor, Lives of Eminent Lawyers and Statesmen of the State of 
New York, with notes of cases tried by them, speeches, anecdotes, and 
Incidents In their lives, New York: S. S. Peloubet & Company 1882, p. 
626. There was, at the time, a group of lawyers who made their living 
arguing cases for other lawyers in front of the state Supreme Court, 
thus saving vast amounts of travel time and inconvenience— Hill was one 
of the best of these.
^®Case reports from state court systems are collected in volumes of 
reports. In New York State, the volumes bore the names of the court 
reporters, hence Wendell's Reports, or Barbour’s Reports, for example.
39 Fruitful investigations of the history of rape law are by no means 
unique to cases originating in the state of New York: see, for example, 
Constance B. Backhouse,The Sayer Street Outrage': Gang Rape and Male 
Law in 19th Century Toronto," and James A. Vaught and Margaret Henning, 
"Admissibility of a Rape Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct in Texas: A 
Contemporary Review and Analysis."
40 Cynthia S. Jordan, "'Old Words' in 'New Circumstances’: Language and 
Leadership in Post-Revolutionary America," American Quarterly, vol. 40, 
December 1988, no. 4: 503. Subsequent citations will appear 
parenthetically in the text.
4lThe Essex Result, 1778, is the response of a convention of delegates 
from towns including Salem, Danvers, Waltham, and Ipswich to the
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proposed Massachusetts Constitution. The document contains objections 
from issues of property ("11. That in a free government, a law affecting 
the person and property of it's [sic] members, is not valid, unless it 
has the consent of a majority of the members, which majority should 
include those, who hold a major part of property in the state." (81))to 
gender ("Women what age soever they are of, are also considered as not 
having a sufficient acquired discretion; not from a deficiencey in their 
mental powers, but from the natural tenderness and delicacy of their 
minds, their retired mode of life, and various domestic duties." (81)). 
From Massachusetts, Colony to Commonwealth: Documents on the Formation 
of Its Constitution, 1775-1780, edited by Robert J. Taylor, Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early 
American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, (1961).
Cowen was following an already well-established pattern here. As 
Stephen P. Pistonio points out, "In 1285, the Statute of Westminster 
proclaimed that any man guilty of raping a married woman or virgin 
would be considered guilty of a felony and put to death"(italics mine): 
the judgment about which women were entitled to protection from violent 
crime was already in place. (Stephen P. Pistonio, "Susan Brownmiller and 
the History of Rape," Women's Studies. Volume 14, no. 3, 1988, p. 271).
See, for example, Marybeth Hamilton, p. 246 or Jackson, p. 397.
Cowen'8 opinion, though dictum, has been extremely influential in 
rape law. In People v. Carey, 223 N. Y. 519, 119 N.E. 83, for example, 
the court opined that "Rape is not committed unless the woman oppose the 
man to the utmost limit of her power. A feigned or passive or 
perfunctory resistance is not enough. It must be genuine and active and 
proportioned to the outrage." (519) While there is room for interpretive 
possibility in the phrase "utmost limit of her power," the court makes 
its position clear in the following sentences. Regardless of the 
circumstances, in order to seek the protection of the court a woman must 
be able to prove that she exerted active resistance against her 
attacker. Carey is an interesting case in that some members of the
court wished to follow Cowen on another matter, as noted: "Some of the
members of the court desire to place their concurrence upon the 
additional ground that error was committed in rejecting testimony 
tending to prove that the complainant was unchaste. They think that the 
exclusion of such testimony may work a denial of justice."
^^Hamilton, 235.
46 The catalogue of Cowen's law library includes Thomas Hobbes' 
Leviathan, explaining, perhaps, this grim view of human nature.
47 cowen continues, puzzlingly, "I have long had occasion to know and to 
consider much, the two cases cited as adverse to the reception of this 
evidence; and I never yet could bring myself to doubt that circumstances 
much more remote and of less influence are constantly received on the 
best authority " (Abbot, 196). I am not sure how to begin to try to 
figure out what this means, but it does suggest that there is more going
on for Cowen in this case than meets the eye.
48 New York Revised Statutes.
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And economic motivation, in women, may have been more cause for 
distrust than lust; in post-revolutionary society men were the only ones 
who were supposed to be concerned with money and economic growth.
The Messalina image was a part of the language of female sexuality 
well before Esek Cowen came on the scene. William Byrd (1674-1744), for 
example, quotes long anecdotes related to issues of female sexuality in 
his commonplace book, including the following:
Messalina, who obliged 25 men in 20 hours, and 
Cleopatra, who in one night stood the attacque of 105 
young Fellows woud have made sad Disciples to that 
Philiosopher (Solon). The first of these illustrious 
Ladys when she had passt thro' the whole number askt 
if there were no more, for tho she was tired she was 
not satisfyd. (Lockridge, 11)
In Commonwealth vs. Edward J. Manning (328 N.E. 2d 496), a case heard 
on appeal before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
December, 1974, the defendant had been convicted of "rape, sodomy, 
unnnatural and lascivious acts, and assault and battery." (496)
Manning's lawyers had attempted, during the original trial, to introduce 
evidence showing the complainant's "poor reputation for chastity."
(496). The Appeals Court held that the trial judge should not have 
excluded this evidence, and reversed the conviction; the Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld this decision. Justice Braucher, however, 
dissented,
I think the exceptions should be overruled on the 
indictments for sodomy, unnatural and lascivious acts, 
and assault and battery, for the reasons given by the 
Appeals Court: 'The excluded testimony. . . .bore only 
on the issue of consent, not on veracity. Wigmore,
Evidence, @ 924b . . . . The convictions on the other 
indictments are therefore not affected by the error.'
In view of the extended discussion of the point by the 
court, some elaboration of these reasons is 
appropriate. The 'established law' on which the 
court's opinion rests is part of a legal tradition, 
established by men, that the complaining woman in a 
rape case is fair game for character assassination in 
open court. Its logical underpinnings are shaky in the 
extreme. See, for example. People v. Abbott [sic] . .
. .:'And will you not more readily infer assent in the 
practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the 
reserved and virtuous Lucretia?' . . . .The trouble is
that the court reasons logically, using an illogical 
rule as its major premise. {Manning, 496 ff).
As we can see, the Abbot fJackson 'debate' over the character of 
the rape victim is still being played out, over 100 years later.
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^^Few references to Abbot mention this seeming disjunction. An exception 
is Charles P. Nemeth's essay, "Character Evidence in rape trials in 
nineteenth century New York; Chastity and the admissibility of specific 
acts," Women's Rights Law Reporter. Spring 1980, vol. 6, no. 3. Nemeth 
notes that "further inspection of this opinion leaves the reader with 
the impression that Justice Cowen distrusted loose women," (219, n. 22) 
and that Cowen "seemed insulted that a woman whose reputation for 
chastity was less than sanctimonious would dare beckon his court for a 
remedy," (219, n. 23) but does not interrogate the issue further.
Nemeth, too, contrasts the opinion in Abbot with Justice Selah Strong's 
opinion in Jackson, but concludes simply that "the Jackson decision was 
a methodical and scholarly effort to apply the rules and decisions of 
the day." (220) It seems to me that this conclusion, while acceptable on 
a superficial level, merely skims the surface of rich interpretive 
possibility.
53 "I don't want to prosecute;" a way of dismissing an indictment. For 
example, if District Attorney Theron Strong wanted to try Orson Abbot 
for assault before the Court of General Sessions, he should have said 
that he did not want to prosecute Abbot for rape.
"Heard before the wrong court."
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As influential as Judge Cowen's opinion has been,
there is another thread besides Abbot at work in the history
of evidence rules in rape law. The New York Supreme Court,
in May, 1857, heard the case People v, Joseph Jackson .
Joseph Jackson and John Dixon were charged with the rape of
Catharine Sullivan, the assault allegedly taking place in
late August, 1856. Jackson and Dixon were convicted in the
Kings County Court of Oyer and Terminer. According to the
record, it was July, 1856, when Catharine Sullivan left
Liverpool for New York on the ship City of Brooklyn. While
on board ship, Catharine Sullivan was alleged to have had an
affair with a fellow passenger. Dr. Mason, an allegation
Sullivan denied. The counsel for the defense offered to
prove that this affair had taken place as evidence of
Sullivan’s "general bad character for c h a s t i t y , b u t  the
Court of Oyer and Terminer refused to allow his evidence.
The court reporter's note is reproduced here:
On the trial of an indictment for rape it is 
not competent, on the part of the defence, to 
prove acts of illicit sexual intercourse 
between the prosecutrix and persons other 
than the defendant, although the prosecutrix 
had previously been asked, on her cross- 
examination, in relation to such illicit 
acts, and had denied them (a). (This case 
overrules The People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192.)
Again, the point of law on which Abbot was decided had
nothing to do with the admissibility of evidence on the
60
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previous actions or character of the prosecutrix. Cowen's
opinion, however, had such force that the resonance of the
case was precisely on that issue. As I have previously
noted, the portion of the opinion that is obiter dictum
continues on for pages, while the procedural issue is
mentioned in two or three paragraphs at the very end of the
opinion. And Justice Selah B. Strong (cousin of Theron
Strong, the district attorney in the Abbot case) does not
necessarily disagree with Judge Cowen on the issue of the
complainant's character:
It is certainly right that the testimony of 
the female preferring the complaint should be 
subjected to the strictest scrutiny 
compatible with the due administration of 
justice; she is a necessary and generally the 
sole witness of the transaction.(People v,
Jackson, 397)
Like Cowen, Selah Strong exhibits a great deal of
concern for the defendant, taking pains to note that in
rape cases men are at the mercy of women:
Experience has shown that the charge is 
frequently unfounded and instituted from 
impure motives. It is hard to meet the 
testimony of a cunning and unprincipled woman 
in reference to what is alleged to have taken 
place in the presence only of herself and of 
the accused, whose mouth of course is closed.
It is therefore deemed essential that the 
charge should be supported by attending 
considerations or circumstances, such as that 
the witness is of good fame; that she 
presently disclosed the offence and made 
exertions for the detection and prosecution 
of the offender; that she exhibited marks and 
signs of the injury, and that the alleged
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secluded place. (People v. Jackson, 397)
Strong's list of conditions is a reminder that the
logistical and emotional difficulty of bringing charges
against a rapist has quite a long history. According to
Stephen Pistonio, in medieval society there were
six steps a woman was compelled to follow if 
she wanted to bring her assailant to justice: 
she must create a public outcry over the 
crime as soon as possible, exhibit her torn 
garments and bleeding to men of good standing 
in the neighboring towns, explain the crime 
to local law officials, make a formal 
accusation at the first county court to be 
held, repeat her accusation before the 
coroners so that it could be taken down 
verbatim for the public records and finally 
prosecute the offender in the royal circuit 
court as the earliest opportunity. (Pistonio,
271)
The medieval conditions are repeated in almost 
identical fashion in Strong's opinion, although he does 
not require that the alleged victim exhibit her 
bleeding before the court.
Strong, however, introduces an exception into the
question of resistance when he suggests that threats
and intimidation are legitimate reasons to appear to
comply with a rapist:
It is absolutely necessary to the 
constitution of the offence that the outraged 
female should have resisted to the extent of 
her power until the crime was consummated, 
unless such resistance was prevented by 
threats and intimidation. As the complainants 
more frequently pervert the truth and are 
harder to be met in reference to this
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courts have very properly allowed to the 
defendants considerable latitude in proving 
contradictory circumstances. {People v.
Jackson, 397)
By including the phrase "to the extent of her power" as 
well as broaching the issue of potential "threats and 
intimidation," Strong makes explicit his recognition of 
the nature of the crime of rape.
Unlike Cowen, Selah Strong seems prepared to treat rape 
as a violent crime, and one in which issues of power 
and control play important roles.
And there is another important difference in the
way Strong and Cowen view women:
In any case, a single aberration from virtue, 
in one whose general character for chastity 
is otherwise unimpeachable, would raise so 
slight an inference, if any, of non- 
resistance to a brutal outrage from a person, 
or indeed to any one except him to whom she 
had previously yielded, that it would not 
justify a departure from the ordinary rules 
of evidence. {People v. Jackson, 398)
For Cowen, as we have seen, one instance of 
unsanctioned-by-marriage sexual activity was enough to 
place a woman in the "tenant of the stew" category. Given 
the burgeoning popularity of the religious revival movement 
at the time, such linguistic equations may well have seemed 
natural to him.Something in the equation had changed, 
however, by the time Justice Strong wrote the Jackson
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opinion. In that opinion, Justice Strong responds to Judge 
Cowen:
It is true that Judge Cowen, in the case of 
The People v. Abbot (19 Wend. 192), 
disapproves of the rule, strongly sustained 
as it is by numerous judicial decisions and 
the opinions of many elementary writers; but 
the point was not necessarily raised in that 
case, as the conviction was reversed on the 
ground that the Court of General Sessions, 
before which the trial for a rape had been 
conducted, had no jurisdiction of the case, 
and what was said by the learned judge as to 
the rejection of the evidence was a mere 
obiter dictum . (Jackson, 400)
Strong denied the motion for a new trial and instructed the
Court of Oyer and Terminer to "sentence the defendant
conformably to his conviction" (Jackson, 400). The decision
favorable to women, however, can be read as being perhaps
class-based, and is not cited as much as Abbot. I originally
read the tone of Strong's opinion as suggesting that not all
members of the bar regarded Judge Cowen's work in the same
favorable light. I think it is possible, however to read
Strong's opinion with deeper insight. Not only was Cowen's
opinion highly critical of District Attorney Theron Strong,
one of Selah Strong's many cousins, the bulk of the opinion,
that which Strong labels "mere obiter dictum,» had already
become part of an evolving body of thought on evidence.
Could Strong have been objecting to the molding of precedent
by dicta ? There was, in Jackson, a set of complex
circumstances quite different enough from those in Abbot .
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Strong may well have felt that blindly applying Cowen's 
words— no matter how learned and well-respected their 
author, and regardless of whether he agreed with Cowen—  
might have been inappropriate.
Yet it is certainly possible to locate examples of less
culturally-bound (or more humane and equality-minded) early
to mid-nineteenth century lawyers and judges, as I have
shown via the Jackson case. Linda Kerber has shown that
Daniel Davis, solicitor general, and James Sullivan, the
attorney general, who argued for the state in Martin v.
Massachusetts (1805), seem also to have been early
feminists. Sullivan's arguments for the state in this case
(which dealt with the seizure of a Tory loyalist couple's
property, the property rights of the wife's heirs, and the
wife's citizenship) were
congruent with the unusually consistent 
liberalism he displayed throughout his 
career. Believing that society was composed 
of equal individuals, he spun out the 
implications of that belief in a wide range 
of issues as they presented themselves—  
banking and the economy, religious freedom, 
an end to slavery, and even gender 
relations.
Davis and Sullivan undercut the concept of coverture, saying 
that "the politicized woman did have 'a will of her own' for 
which she was responsible and for which she could be 
punished" (ĥ omen of the Republic, 134). The "Federalist 
judges"(Women of the Republic, 135) did not buy this
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argument, and ruled, in effect, that Anna Martin could not 
be viewed as a fully vested citizen, as one of her son's 
lawyers, Theophilus Parsons, had argued (asking "'whether 
the statute was intended to include persons who have, by 
law, no wills of their own'"^®).
People V. Jackson, 392.
The influx of revival meetings in western New York State may not have 
had a direct effect on every inhabitant, but the young Elizabeth Cady 
was assigned "novels by Sir Walter Scott, James Fenimore Cooper, and 
Charles Dickens, the rational philosophy of George Combe, and works 
about phrenology" (Griffith, 21) by her brother-in-law in an effort to 
offset distress brought on by attending revival meetings. I hope that 
further research will allow me to expand on this point. Also, 
"organizations for abolition, temperance, and Christian benevolence 
flourished in upstate New York" (Griffith, 21): this may well be what 
brought Orson Abbot to Sodus.
Linda Kerber, "The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early 
Republic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts,” The American Historical 
Review, vol. 97, no. 2, April 1992, p.358.
Women of the Republic, 134. And see Kerber, "The Paradox of Women's 
Citizenship in the Early Republic; The Case of Martin vs.
Massachusetts,” and "'She Can Have No will Different From His': 
Revolutionary Loyalties of Married Women," pages 115-136 in Women of the 
Republic, for a full discussion of the import of this fascinating case 
and others which attempted to define women's status in the new republic.
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Abbot was a prosecution for assault and battery, and
rape. The woman in question was thirteen at the time the
alleged attacks began. She had no economic assets or well-
placed family connections to make her an important member of
the community. She was a servant, and a servant who had, in
the past, been unable to maintain her indenture obligations
to more than one family. Under the circumstances, there
seems to have been little opportunity for Philena
Morehouse's voice to be heard in Judge Cowen's court. Even
the various court reporters' versions of her testimony are
inflected by the choices they necessarily had to make, not
being tape recorders but human beings. Cynthia Jordan
remarks that
the texts left to us by the Revolutionary 
generation both describe and employ a 
language burdened with the multiple task of 
breaking with past definitions, interpreting 
the present in the interest of the public 
good, and remaining flexible enough to 
accommodate future reinterpretations.(510)
While the first two tasks seem immediately applicable to
Judge Cowen's opinion in the Abbot case, his linguistic
choices strongly suggest a desire to resist rather than
accommodate "future reinterpretations,"59 and thus preserve
a cultural moment without the possibility of future
misreading.
Cowen's opinion can be read as representing the
philosophy of one man, to be sure, but the language he uses
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
suggests that the modes and habits of thought that were 
familiar to him, and which informed every word of the Abbot 
opinion, were almost universally familiar to his 
contemporaries as well. As Daniel A. Cohen notes in his 
discussion of the influence of nineteenth-century trial 
reports on the fiction of the time, "editors and lawyers not 
only used sentimental language themselves but seemed to 
assume that their mature neighbors were attuned to fictive 
discourse as well."^®
Boundaries between fiction and non-fiction were 
occasionally blurred in the nineteenth century, as they 
occasionally are today, and the narrative of Cowen's opinion 
might well have been deliberately constructed to resemble 
other familiar contemporary texts. And this was by no means 
a new phenomenon. The blurred boundaries are apparent in 
late eighteenth-century fiction as well. Cathy N. Davidson 
points out that "in the changing world of the turn of the 
eighteenth century, many new readers wanted to read about 
characters like themselves, characters with whom they could 
identify and about whom they could fantasize."^1 Susanna 
Rowson's Charlotte Temple, f o r  example, an extremely 
popular novel of seduction and the subsequent— almost 
immediate— dreadful ramifications thereof, seems to have had 
roots in an actual unhappy seduction, Rowson's language
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shows her as being squarely in the tradition that produced 
Esek Cowen.
For me, then, several big questions remain. What 
influences led Judge Cowen and Judge Strong to have such 
different opinions of women and women's sexuality? Were 
their views all that different, or is it simply that they 
had different views of the importance of character evidence 
in sexual assault cases— is it possible that Strong had an 
equally firm dichotomy in mind but different courtroom 
values? What role did other historical events,including 
the Seneca Falls Convention, have on the men who wrote these 
opinions?
As I noted earlier, the boundaries between fact and 
fiction were occasionally blurred. As the publishing 
industry grew, and as more Americans learned to read, the 
items available for their literary consumption began to 
enter into the cultural vocabulary. It is important, then, 
not to discount the influence of Samuel Richardson's 
Clarissa: The History of a Young Lady on literate 
nineteenth-century America. Richardson's novel was as 
important an influence on white American women writers as 
Charlotte Bronte or the Romantics. The novel, published in 
1748, quickly became an important literary success. As 
Linda Kerber points out, Richardson's novel "offers sexual 
adventure, but blames the heroine for it."(Women of the
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Republic, 249) Both Pamela and Clarissa were widely 
available and widely read by men and women. It is not 
surprising that aspects of the plots of these very popular 
novels would become part of that culture's frame of 
reference. Clarissa's rape, occurring as it did while she 
was unconscious, provides an almost infinitely expandable 
arena for a discussion of consent. And Lovelace’s attitude 
draws on historical and Biblical precedent when he suggests 
that he may be able to gain retroactive consent by 
persuading Clarissa to marry h i m . And, as Frances Ferguson 
points out, "the rape becomes the vehicle for the contrast 
between what could be said in public and proved and what is 
said in private and believed."(99) Implicit in Ferguson's 
comment is a (perceived) difference between what is said in 
public and what is said in private; this apparent 
disjuncture in communication is visible in every prosecution 
for rape. The vengeful or duplicitous woman who brings false 
charges of rape springs from this split; her assumed 
embodiment in every victim of rape may be an admission that 
men and women speak differently about rape.
Women writers began to attempt a parallel discourse 
around the middle of the nineteenth century and continue 
t o d a y : t h i s  alternative way of regarding women as sexual 
beings was often heavily influenced by Gothic traditions and 
thus rendered many books easily dismissible by critics as
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trashy or sentimental novels. What distinguishes these 
alternative texts— both novels and the Jackson tradition of 
rape case opinions— is that they allow the possibility of a 
more humane reading of women's sexual experiences.
Elizabeth Stoddard's novel The Morgesons ( 1 8 6 2 ) is, 
like Selah Strong's opinion in People v. Jackson, one 
example of such an attempt at a parallel discourse. The 
novel, which met with little financial success, uses some of 
the best-known women's novels of the day (including Susan 
Warner's The Wide, Wide World , which was the best-selling 
novel in the United States until the publication of Uncle 
Tom's Cabin in 1862) as a starting point for its exploration 
of the possibilities realistically available for a 
nineteenth-century New England woman aware of her capacity 
for sexual desire. Cassandra Morgeson, the protagonist, 
struggles to create a place for herself in society without 
denying the desire that is integral to her sense of self.
This effort leaves Cassandra scarred, both literally 
and figuratively. But her scars are not entirely a source of 
shame to Cassandra, and she describes them, accurately, as 
wounds received in battle, even to a prospective suitor so 
bold as to inquire:
I heard a low voice at my ear, and felt a slight 
touch from the tip of a finger on my cheek.
"How came those scars?"
I brushed my cheek with my handkerchief, and 
answered, "I got them in battle." {Morgesons, 173)
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This somewhat cryptic exchange turns out to be crucial to 
Cassandra's ultimate choice of partner. Her growing 
attraction to this man, Desmond Somers, is characterized by 
her efforts to have him see her clearly, and to correct his 
misreading of her past, initiated by their differing 
definitions of "battle." Cassandra doesn't realize at first 
that Desmond understands her to mean a battle to preserve 
her chastity from a would-be ravisher. Once this becomes 
clear to her, she takes pains to have him understand that it 
was, in fact, a battle between her own desire and cultural 
restriction; a battle that resulted in the accidental death 
of her married cousin and lover Charles Morgeson.
Stoddard does not allow her heroine to draw a veil of
misunderstanding (and hence respectability) over her scars.
Rather it is Cassandra's struggle to maintain some kind of
honesty about her sexual desire that occupies the bulk of
the novel. Stoddard draws heavily on the Gothic imagery of
flowers and horses in representing Cassandra's desire, but
also uses Cassandra's relationship with the sea in a
particularly powerful set of images, most notably in a
exchange between Cassandra and her mother, with Cousin
Charles looking on:
Cousin Charles' hawk eyes caught the look, 
and he heard me too, when I tapped her 
shoulder till she turned round and smiled. I 
whispered, "Mother, your eyes are as blue as 
the sea yonder, and I love you." She glanced
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along the shore, licking the rocks and sand 
as if recognizing a master. And I saw and 
felt its steady, resistless heaving, 
insidious and terrible. {Morgesons, 63)
Stoddard links the sea and Cassandra's awakening sexuality.
She introduces issues of power and control in her
description of the sea "licking the rocks and sand as if
recognizing a master," and hints at the danger inherent, for
Cassandra, in any expression of sexuality, with the use of
the words "resistless," "insidious," and "terrible."
Stoddard's sensually-charged language is even more striking
when read against Esek Cowen's allusion-laden jeremiad. It
seems almost impossible that Elizabeth Stoddard and Esek
Cowen were both writing about women in the northeastern
United States within a thirty year time period.
Cassandra's struggle with sexual expression and 
cultural boundaries, I would argue, is Stoddard's effort to 
add her distinctive voice to the ongoing discussion of 
appropriate roles for women. Some women felt confined by 
domestic roles, as did nearly all Stoddard's female 
characters. Some women did not shy from experiencing and 
expressing sexual desire, as some of her personal letters 
suggest about Stoddard herself. In Stoddard's view, the 
Republican Wife or Mother was an unrealistic, and possibly 
unhealthy construct. The Morgesons is Stoddard's response to 
the attitudes embodied in Judge Cowen's opinion.
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The influence Abbot and Judge Cowen have had on a 
discourse of female sexuality is evident, as I have shown, 
in contemporary prosecutions for rape. Even today, despite 
efforts in some states to reform evidence laws regarding 
rape cases, a woman's entire sexual history may well be part 
of a discussion of her right to the court's protection. And 
men and women still seem to speak different languages when 
they discuss these issues. On a first reading, Cowen's 
opinion leaped out at me, trained as I am to read through a 
lens of feminist criticism, as anachronistic and appalling. 
While Esek Cowen's dictum has had a far-reaching influence 
on rape law, closer inspection reveals a long-standing 
resistance to his reading of sexually active women, a 
resistance by men and women, in media that included legal 
opinions and fiction. The lengthy and discursive opinion in 
People V, Abbot, then, offers a rare opportunity for 
interpretation and contextualization, and an opportunity to 
reexamine assumptions; it provides an avenue into a larger 
understanding of the events and influences shaping rape law, 
views of women as sexual beings, and the culture we inhabit.
S^And as far as reinterpretations are concerned, I must confess to a 
feeling of some dismay upon reading that Philena Morehouse had been 
caught attempting to make off with some of Mrs. Abbot's belongings on 
the day she was removed from the Abbot household. In an all-too- 
predictable way I found myself both doubting her testimony and 
constructing a complicated set of possibilities to justify her alleged 
actions that Sunday.
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^^Daniel A. Cohen, Pillars of Salt, Monuments of Grace: New England 
Crime Literature and the Origins of American Popular Culture, 1674—1860, 
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Cathy N. Davidson, Revolution and the Word; The Rise of the Novel in 
^erica. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
The first American edition of Rowson's novel appeared in 1794; the 
first British edition three years earlier.
®^As I searched for primary sources to fill in some of the missing 
background in this case, it was brought to my attention that the Wayne 
Sentinel, the weekly newspaper that would have covered the Abbot trial, 
is available on microfilm from two libraries in Utah; Brigham Young 
University and the Historian’s Office of the Mormon Church. Palmyra, New 
York, (the county seat for Wayne County) turns out to be the site of the 
annual Mormon celebration of Joseph Smith’s revelation. I hope to 
investigate this source as I continue my research.
See Frances Ferguson, "Rape and the Rise of the Novel," in Misogyny, 
Misandry, and Misanthropy, edited by R. Howard Bloch and Frances 
Ferguson, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, (especially p. 
102 and following) for an exploration of this theme, cunong others.
The "bad" mother continues to be easily identifiable by her sexual 
activity— see Sue Miller, The Good Mother, for example.
Elizabeth Stoddard, The Morgesons and Other Writings, Published and 
Unpublished, edited by Lawrence Buell and Sandra A. Zagarell, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.
Susan Warner, The Wide, Wide World, reprint edition New York: The 
Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1987.
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